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Abstract—Federated Learning (FL) has been recently proposed
as an emerging paradigm to build machine learning models
using distributed training datasets that are locally stored and
maintained on different devices in 5G networks while providing
privacy preservation for participants. In FL, the central aggrega-
tor accumulates local updates uploaded by participants to update
a global model. However, there are two critical security threats:
poisoning and membership inference attacks. These attacks may
be carried out by malicious or unreliable participants, resulting in
the construction failure of global models or privacy leakage of FL
models. Therefore, it is crucial for FL to develop security means
of defense. In this article, we propose a blockchain-based secure
FL framework to create smart contracts and prevent malicious or
unreliable participants from involving in FL. In doing so, the cen-
tral aggregator recognizes malicious and unreliable participants
by automatically executing smart contracts to defend against
poisoning attacks. Further, we use local differential privacy
techniques to prevent membership inference attacks. Numerical
results suggest that the proposed framework can effectively deter
poisoning and membership inference attacks, thereby improving
the security of FL in 5G networks.
Index Terms—5G Networks, Federated Learning, Privacy Pro-
tection, Blockchain, Smart Contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed machine learning has spawned a lot of useful
applications, such as on-device learning and edge computing
[1]. However, due to communication delays and network band-
width limitations in fourth-generation (4G) networks, mobile
users holding smart devices with limited computing power
cannot fully participate in distributed machine learning tasks.
Fortunately, in the fifth-generation (5G) networks, bottlenecks
attributed to communication latency and network bandwidth
will be overcome [2]. Therefore, attention can be focused on
addressing the performance and efficiency issues of distributed
machine learning can be addressed. Consequently, mobile
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devices will be able to participate in distributed machine
learning. However, traditional distributed machine learning
techniques require a certain amount of private data to be
aggregated and analyzed at central servers during the model
training phase [3]. Such a training process would lead to
potential privacy leakage for users in 5G networks [4], [5].
To address such privacy challenges, McMahan et al. [6] pro-
posed a collaboratively distributed machine learning paradigm
for mobile devices called Federated Learning (FL). FL in-
volves the training machine learning models over devices 1
or siloed data centers while maintaining the training datasets
locally without sharing raw training data [7]. The procedure
of FL execution is divided into three phases: initialization,
aggregation, and update phases. In the initialization phase, the
central aggregator presents a pre-trained global model on a
public dataset (e.g., MNIST2, CIFAR-103), to each device.
Following that, each device uses 5G networks to train and
improve the current global model on the local dataset in
each iteration. In the aggregation phase, the central aggregator
aggregates local model updates (i.e., gradient information)
from the devices. In the update phase, the central aggre-
gator aggregates all local model updates to generate a new
global model for the next iteration. Both the devices and the
central aggregator repeats the above process until the global
model reaches a certain accuracy or optimal convergence. This
paradigm significantly reduces the risks of privacy leakage by
decoupling the model training from direct access to the raw
training data [7].
Although FL brings new application scenarios (e.g., edge
computing and on-device learning) to devices in 5G networks,
it still suffers from two critical threats: poisoning and mem-
bership inference attacks [8]. Firstly, if the poisoning attack
occurs, an unreliable device submits an “error update”, FL
model would be “poisoned.” [9] A vicious attack will cause a
failure in FL global model update. Secondly, in the case of the
membership inference attack, since the intermediate gradients
in training models always contain rich semantic information
(e.g., model parameters), adversaries could exploit reverse
engineering techniques to access some sensitive information
(e.g., raw distribution of training data) [10]. Therefore, these
vulnerabilities compel the need to develop a secure and
privacy-preserving framework for FL, where the global model
updates can be aggregated more securely.
1We use the term ‘device’ throughout this article to describe entities in 5G
networks, such as edge nodes, clients, smartphones, etc.
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
3http://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
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In this study, we propose a secure FL framework that
exploits the capabilities of smart contracts in blockchain to
defend against poisoning attacks and also introduce local
differential privacy techniques to mitigate inference attacks.
Specifically, smart contracts allow a task publisher to reward
participants who can provide well-trained local models for a
specific FL task [11]. The proposed framework establishes a
marketplace to train FL models in an automated and anony-
mous manner for each participant (i.e., mobile device) through
5G networks. The local differential privacy technique provides
robust defensive measures against membership inference at-
tacks by adding well-designed noises to the model updates
during the model training phase [10]. Based on the proposed
framework, a central aggregator can create a decentralized and
trustless marketplace to eliminate the impact of overreliance
on participants in FL.
In 5G communication systems, task publishers can be typi-
cally deployed on edge nodes with sufficient storage and data
processing capabilities, and mobile devices can easily access
edge nodes to train local models. The proposed framework
creates a marketplace where participants that are skilled in
solving FL problems can profit directly from smart contracts
[11]. The main contributions of this study are summarized as
follows:
• We design a blockchain-based federated learning frame-
work to achieve secure and reliable federated learning as
well as all-round defense against poisoning attacks.
• We introduce the local differential privacy technology
as a firewall against membership inference attacks on
federated learning models.
• We create a marketplace where participants endowed in
solving federated learning problems can benefit directly
from their skills. This will provide a trustworthy platform
to motivate participants to create better federated learning
models.
II. FEDERATED LEARNING AND ITS THREATS
A. Federated Learning and Its Application Scenarios in 5G
Networks
Federated Learning [6], [12] is a collaborative machine
learning framework that required no centralized training data.
In FL, the local devices download the global model through 5G
networks from the central aggregator, and then these devices
train and improve the current global model by using their local
raw data [6]. Typically, each device trains its local model using
Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (D-SGD) algorithm
[13] and uploads the model updates (i.e., gradient information)
to a central aggregator [7]. The aggregator updates a new
global model by collecting all local updates and calculating the
mean value of these local model updates. Federated learning
aims to build machine learning models based on datasets
stored locally in distributed devices without compromising
privacy.
Some typical FL application scenarios in 5G networks are
listed as follows.
• Internet of Things (IoT): ByteLAKE and Lenovo present a
technique called Federated Intelligence IoT4 that not only
enables IoT devices in 5G networks to learn from each
other but also makes it possible to leverage local machine
learning models on IoT devices. In such scenarios, FL
could be applied to build a personalized voice assistant
without compromising personal privacy.
• Internet of Vehicles (IoV): The Shenzhen Municipal Gov-
ernment in China cooperates with commercial organiza-
tions such as DiDi Chuxing and HelloBike companies to
conduct the real-time traffic flow forecasting [1] based
on IoV in 5G networks. Meanwhile, General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR)5 prohibits any organization
from directly trading personal data due to concerns about
privacy leakage. Therefore, FL can be applied to build a
traffic flow prediction model that not only improves the
prediction accuracy but also protects personal privacy.
B. Threats and Countermeasures
Although FL has many promising applications in scenarios
related to 5G networks, two threats have been identified as
obstacles to its full-scale deployment. Noting that it is assumed
that the central aggregator is not compromised or malicious,
we enunciate the two threats as follows:
• Threat 1: Participants with malicious behaviors. Partic-
ipants may have intentional or unintentional malicious
behaviors during FL training phase [7]. Intentional ma-
licious participants can submit wrong model updates,
failing the update of the FL model. Unintentional mali-
cious participants may upload model updates that have a
negative effect on global model updates as they utilize
low-quality training data. When the central aggregator
aggregates these local model updates to update the global
model, it eventually makes a poor accuracy or even
useless global model. All of these intentional or un-
intentional malicious behaviors may “poison” the FL
model. In a word, the current FL models rely on a trust
mechanism, which makes it vulnerable to suffer from
poisoning attacks [14].
• Threat 2: Disclosure of sensitive information. In FL, each
participant uploads the updated parameters of the own
local training model to the central aggregator. However,
existing studies show that adversaries can still initiate
a membership inference attack to obtain sensitive infor-
mation from the updated parameters associated with the
local data. Specially, adversaries can utilize the sensitive
information disclosed by network snooping attacks in 5G
networks to threaten the privacy of FL model.
To address the poisoning attack, in [7], Kang et al. ex-
plored using blockchains to build a decentralized market using
identity and reputation systems to deter poisoning attacks.
However, such a method favours the gradient direction for
updates uploaded from participants with high reputation value,
which leads to the poor generalization ability of FL. Moreover,
4https://becominghuman.ai/theres-a-better-way-of-doing-ai-in-the-iot-era-
feabbbc1b589
5https://eugdpr.org/
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Task publisher creates a new contract. 
Here is an example: 
Criteria: The  classification accuracy of  MNIST dataset >A  
Federated Learning Task: Classification, prediction, etc. 
Model: The initial global model (e.g, AlexNet) 
Data: Testing dataset 
Reward: 200 ETH tokens  
Contract is published to the Ethereum blockchain. 
The devices download 
the global model and 
conduct local model 
training locally. 
Device 1 Device 2 Device n 
Local Model Training 
2 The model updates are submitted and run on the Ethereum Blockchain using 
the testing data from the contract. 
Gaussian Noise Function 
The devices use local differential privacy to 
defend against membership attacks. 
Bob 
If the model  fulfills the criteria 
of the contract, the model is 
sent to the task publisher and 
the payment is paid to the well-
behaved participants. 
Well-behaved  
Participants 
Testing Dataset 
 Initial  Global Model 
Central Aggregator 
New Global Model 
Reward 
Model Updates 
Local data 
Ethereum 
Blockchain 
Local Model 
5G Application Scenarios 
IoV 
IoT 
Wearable 
Local Model Local Model 
Fig. 1. An overview of proposed secure federated learning framework.
for local sensitive information leakage problems, existing
studies show that the differential privacy technique is one
of the best solutions [10]. Therefore, we introduce a local
differential privacy technique to address the poisoning attack
issues. Guided by the above considerations, we outline the
main objectives in the proposed FL framework.
• Establishing fairness trading market for participants in
blockchain-based FL framework. Based on Ethereum, the
proposed framework can create a market for collaborative
training of FL models anonymously. Note that the pro-
posed framework can be also applied to other blockchain
platforms. In this marketplace, honest participants can
make profits by submitting correct solutions to FL prob-
lems. To ensure the security of framework, the central
aggregator verifies the updates of local models based
on smart contracts. The need for mutual trust between
participants in this framework is eliminated because the
protocol uses cryptographic authentication to secure all
transactions.
• Protecting sensitive information in federated learning. In
the proposed framework, participants add well-designed
noises to their model updates by applying the local
differential privacy technique. It utilizes some noise-
adding mechanisms (e.g., Gaussian Noise Mechanism or
Laplace Noise Mechanism) to secure model parameters.
Therefore, even if adversaries gain access to the noise-
adding gradient information, they cannot recover the
original model parameters and local data.
III. SECURE FEDERATED LEARNING FRAMEWORK
We first describe the related concepts and terms used in the
proposed Secure Federated Learning (SFL) framework.
• Smart contracts: Blockchain-based Ethereum implemen-
tation of a smart contract.
• Wallet address: an escrow account of Ethereum that stores
the rewards.
• Task publisher: anyone who can publish FL tasks and
interacts with the central aggregator.
• Central aggregator: an entity responsible for aggregating
model updates uploaded by devices and interacts with the
task publishers.
• Device: a physical entity in 5G networks involving in FL.
• Local model: the model that a device trains with its local
data.
• Global model: an initial global model that is issued by
the task publisher for the devices, and global models
are updated by the central aggregators during model
iterations.
• Model update: the gradient information generated by
local model training.
• Data points: points made up of inputs and outputs.
• Data group: a matrix made up of data points.
Fig. 1 further illustrates the pipeline of the proposed SFL
framework. In this framework, we introduce the smart contract
technique to deter the poisoning attacks (see Fig. 2), and the
local differential privacy technique is applied to curtail the
inference attacks (see Fig. 3).
• Phrase 1, Initialization. A task publisher named Bob
creates a smart contract including a testing dataset, an
initial global model, evaluation criteria, and a reward
amount. The accuracy performance is used as the evalua-
tion criterion to evaluate the training quality of FL model.
The reward is a monetary reward, such as “ETH” tokens.
The above smart contract is published to the Ethereum
blockchain. The central aggregator sends the initial global
model to participants in Ethereum.
• Phrase 2, Aggregation. Each participant downloads the
initial global model to train the local model using its
local dataset. When a device succeeds in training a local
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model, it submits its local model updates to the Ethereum
blockchain. All the Ethereum blockchain miners use the
evaluation function in the smart contracts to evaluate all
uploaded model updates and generate an average value
of model quality for each uploaded model. We note that,
similar to reference [6], a federated averaging algorithm
(i.e., average aggregation) is used in the proposed frame-
work. Participants use a differential privacy technique to
add well-designed noise to the uploaded model updates.
The high-quality (i.e., high accuracy) model updates with
larger values (e.g., if it is larger than a given threshold
determined by task publishers) will be sent to the central
aggregator.
• Phrase 3, Update. The task publisher gets the current
global model from the central aggregator, and then pre-
pares for the next round of iterative training.
The proposed SFL framework allows participants in the
blockchain to implement local model training for rewards in a
trustless manner. Moreover, the participants will be rewarded
by the efforts of their high accuracy model updates for FL
tasks. As presented in Fig. 2, the detailed steps of the phases
mentioned above are described as follows.
A. Initialization Phase
Step 1: The task publisher creates a smart contract with the
following operations.
• The initialization function init() is called to initialize SFL
framwork.
• The number of iterations is based on the size of the
blocks.
• The task publisher hashes the testing dataset into the
hashed data groups using a certain hash function.
Step 2: The task publisher hashes the indices of the data
groups and sends this hashed result as the seed of random
numbers to the central aggregator. The task publisher stores the
reward in an encrypted address. Next, the central aggregator
calls the init() function to initialize SFL framework.
Step 3: The central aggregator verifies the testing data
with the hash value previously provided for the data groups
and writes the testing data groups and the random numbers
into the smart contracts. The devices in 5G networks call
the get global model() and get FL task() functions to receive
the global model and FL task sent by the central aggregator,
respectively.
At this point, the smart contracts initialization in SFL
framework has been completed. Devices can begin to train
their local models for a particular FL task.
B. Aggregation Phase
Step 1: Local model training. In this step, each device calls
the local model training() function to use its local data to
train the local model. Without loss of generality, it is assumed
that D-SGD algorithm [13] is used to update the local model
updates.
Step 2: Noise Addition. As shown in Fig. 3, each device
uses Gaussian Noise Mechanism (GNM) to add noise on
the local model updates prior to submission to the central
aggregator. To defend against membership inference attacks,
each device di first perturbs its model updates ui using a
randomized perturbation function f based on GNM. Next, di
sends the perturbed model updates u
′
i to the aggregator instead
of its original model updates ui. To achieve this goal, we
require that the function f satisfies the requirement of (ε, δ)-
local differential privacy ((ε, δ)-LDP) [10], where ε > 0 is a
privacy parameter to make a tradeoff between the security and
the availability, and δ is defined as the probability that plain
ε-LDP is broken. f(u′) is denoted as a fixed-scale Gaussian
noise added to f(u), and the sensitivity S is defined as the
maximum absolute distance between f(u) and f(u′). A device
calls the add noise() function which combines the above
(ε, δ)-LDP method and D-SGD algorithm to improve the
privacy of FL. Meanwhile, the add noise() function contains
two main operations:
• Local Update. Let D be the total number of devices
participate in FL. In each iteration, each device calls
the local model training() function to compute its local
model update. After executing of this function, a device
k obtains its local models {ωk}Dk=0.
• GNM Implementation. Each device can enforce a certain
sensitivity by using scaled versions ∆ω¯k instead of the
true updates, where ∀k, ||∆ω¯k||2< S. Dividing the
GNM’s output by D yields an approximation to the
real average of all device updates, while preventing the
leakage of crucial information about an individual, as
shown in Fig. 3.
Each device executes the submit model update() function to
submit its model update with both the noise-adding gradient
information and the payee address for the task publisher.
Step 3: Evaluation. The central aggregator can evaluate a
single local model by the following operations.
• The central aggregator calls the disclosure test data()
function that applies the testing dataset for local model
evaluation. If the central aggregator fails to calls the
disclosure test data() function, the central aggregator
uses its training dataset to evaluate the local model.
At this point, we note that once the evaluation begins
to perform in the central aggregator, it no longer accepts
model updates from devices. The central aggregator calls
the evaluate local model() function to select the qualified
devices whose model updates meet the evaluation criteria.
It supports the central aggregator to observe the model ag-
gregation results of each round before deciding whether to
stop training, thereby reducing the consumption of comput-
ing resources and gas. Next, the central aggregator calls
the aggregate model update() function to aggregate all local
model parameters in the qualified devices to update the current
global model. A new global model ωt+1 is allocated by adding
this approximation to the current glocal model ωt (see Fig.
2). Finally, the central aggregator calls the evaluate model()
function to evaluate the updated global model and send the
results to the task publisher to complete the current iteration.
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Function  get_global_model()
Function get_FL_task()
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The device performs local model 
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Function  add_noise()
The device adds Gaussian Noise 
to its local model update.
Function  submit_model_update()
The device submits its model 
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Function  disclosure_test_data()
The aggregator  disclosures the 
testing dataset.
Function  evaluate_local_model()
The aggregator evaluates the 
local model updates.
Function  aggregate_model _updates()
The aggregator aggregates all 
qualified model updates.
Update Phase
The task publisher gets a  new 
better global model        .
Function  post_evaluation()
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Function  finalize_contract()
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Fig. 2. The workflow in proposed secure federated learning framework.
C. Update Phase
After the convergence of the global model update or the
number of iterations reaches the upper limit, the qualified
device calls the finalize contract() function to obtain a reward
from the Ethereum blockchain. The central aggregator calls
the post evaluation() function post the results of this FL task.
Finally, the task publisher obtains a new better global model.
Aggregation Phase 
1 
Local Model Training 
Noise Addition 
Call add_noise() function  
2 3 
Evaluation 
Send the true  
 to aggregator 
Membership 
inference attack 
+ 
+noise 
+noise 
Original 
distribution 
What? 
Noise 
distribution 
𝒇(𝒖′) = 𝒇(𝒖) + 𝑵(𝟎,𝝈𝟐𝑺𝟐� 
kω∆
2|| ||/ max(1, )
2
k
k k ωω ω ∆∆ = ∆
Send the scaled versions 
 to aggregator kω∆
Fig. 3. Illustration of three steps of aggregation phase: (1) Each device per-
forms local model training and prepares to submit its local model update, (2)
Each device uses the differential privacy technique to add Gaussian Noise on
the local model update, (3) Each device executes the submit model update()
function to submit the model update.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO POTENTIAL ISSUES
Trust and fairness are critical to any marketplaces, which
make it paramount to design a FL framework where no user
can cheat or gain an advantage over other users. Therefore,
we further present the following solutions to potential issues
related to the proposed framework.
A. Overfitting Problems
Overfitting is one of the most common problems in machine
learning. It reduces the generalization ability of machine
learning models. Our proposed framework is not immune since
overfitting problems could occur when (i) the local training
data contains additional noises; (ii) the local training data is
insufficient; (iii) the local model is over-trained; (iv) the task
publisher releases the testing dataset in advance.
For problems (i), (ii), (iii), the central aggregator can call the
evaluate local model() function based on the testing dataset
to solve. For problem (iv), the task publisher and the central
aggregator should keep the testing dataset unreleased during
the model update phase.
B. Gas Costs Problems
Participants are compensated for the costs of executing
transactions in the blockchain. These costs are called “gas”
[11] in the Ethereum blockchain. To avoid missing the mining
block tasks, participants set the limit of gas themselves.
Therefore, the upper limit of the gas in SFL framework will
result in many devices missing the evaluation of the central
aggregator. It means that the smart contracts would never be
finalized [15].
To solve this problem, we perform the following two
steps: (i) We allow participants to call evaluation functions
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locally for evaluating their models. This approach reduces the
computation required to evaluate the model, thus avoiding the
problem of insufficient gas costs. (ii) The accuracy of the
model needed for the device to receive rewards is announced in
real-time. Therefore, the device can decide whether to submit
a model update based on its local model evaluation result.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. Experiment Setting
To evaluate the performance of the proposed SFL frame-
work, we use Google Tensorflow for the simulation experi-
ments on MNIST dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the task publisher
releases the classification tasks on MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively. For the two tasks, the participants work together
to train the FL model, i.e., AlexNet. 6
The size of participant set P ∈ {10, 100, 200, 300}. It
is assumed that P contains 20% malicious participants that
launched a poisoning attack, 20% unreliable participants with
low-quality data, and 60% well-behaved participants. The
training set of well-behaved participants are randomly selected
by a uniform distribution of 10 categories. It is assumed
that malicious participants mislead the training model by
modifying the labels of the training samples to carry out a
poisoning attack. We use λ as the percentage of the modified
labels that indicate the strength of poisoning attack, where λ
in the experiments is set as 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, respectively.
The Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) represents the probability
distance between a participant’s data distribution and the actual
distribution for the whole population, which is used as a metric
to measure training data quality of the unreliable participants
[7].
We deploy the proposed SFL framework on the Ethereum
blockchain. Further, each participant applies D-SGD algorithm
to update model parameters iteratively. In the experiments,
mini-batch size m = 128, learning rate α = 0.0001, and
dropout rate = 0.5. Like in [10], we adopt a privacy budget
of ε = 8, δ = {e−1, e−3, e−5, e−6} to apply the (ε, δ)-
LDP method, where δ is the acceptable probability when the
differential privacy is unbroken [13].
B. Performance Analysis
Fig. 4 illustrates the accuracy performances of AlexNet
model with different λ and EMDs on MNIST dataset and
CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively, when P = 100. It means
that the three factors λ, EMD, and the number of attackers
influence the accuracy performances. The increase in the
accuracy of the model is accompanied by a decrease in any
one of the above factors. The results show that the proposed
framework can deter poisoning attacks. Specifically, as the
attack intensity increases, the accuracy of the proposed frame-
work remains unchanged. As shown in Fig. 4(b), for example,
the learning accuracy is 65.2% for CIFAR-10 classification
task with 20% malicious participants exhibiting the strongest
6http://papers.nips.cc/paper/4824-imagenet-classification-with-deep-
convolutional-neural-networks
poisoning attack on the AlexNet model (i.e., λ = 20%, EMD
= 1.5). The central aggregator without defensive measures
aggregates a large number of low-quality model updates as the
attack intensity increases, thereby reducing the accuracy of the
model. It implies that AlexNet model in FL fails to perform
image classification tasks under the poisoning attacks.
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Fig. 4. The accuracy performances with respect to λ and EMD on the datasets:
(a) MNIST; (b) CIFAR-10.
Meanwhile, the well-behaved participants call the
add noise() function to add noises to the gradient information,
resulting in the loss of the model accuracy. So, these well-
behaved participants may be misidentified as malicious
participants because they degrade the accuracy performance
of the model. To avoid the confusion of these well-behaved
participants, there is a need to distinguish them from malicious
participants in the proposed SFL framework. Fig. 5 presents
the highest accuracy (HA), minimum accuracy (MA), and
average accuracy (AA) by 10 simulations on MNIST dataset
and CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively. We adopt AA as the
evaluation criteria to determine malicious participants in a FL
task. For example, as presented in Fig. 5(a), when P = 100,
the lowest AA is obtained as 90.32% that is the same as
the accuracy of model in Fig. 4(a) with λ = 5 and EMD
= 1.5. Here, AA (i.e., λ = 5, EMD = 1.5) can be used as
the threshold to determine malicious participants. The central
aggregator calls the evaluate local model() function on the
testing dataset to evaluate the local model uploaded by the
participants. If the result of the above function is lower than
AA, a reward will not be paid to the participant who may
be a malicious participant. If not, the participant calls the
finalize contract() function to get a reward.
For Fig. 5, we compare the accuracy of the proposed
framework with that of a typical FL framework (i.e., non-
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Fig. 5. The accuracy performances with respect to P , ε, and δ on the datasets:
(a) MNIST; (b) CIFAR-10
differentially private (Non-DP) model) at different defense
strengths of inference attacks. Numerical results show a trade-
off between the protection from inference attacks and the
accuracy of the model. Specifically, the accuracies of Non-
DP model are 99.21% and 93.72% on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets, respectively. When δ = e−6, P = 300, Fig.
5 illustrates that the accuracy of the proposed framework is
close to that of the scheme without defensive measures, which
indicates that the local differential privacy mechanism prevents
inference attacks while sacrificing some accuracy. Besides, the
central aggregator uses a batch average aggregation mecha-
nism (see Fig. 2) to mitigate the influence of noises on the
accuracy of the model. Therefore, within a threshold of a
certain number of participants (i.e., in this study, the threshold
is set as 300), the more participants involved in the FL, the
better performance achieved.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this article, we addressed data privacy leakage issues
related to ensuring secure FL in 5G networks. We proposed
a blockchain-based framework to defend against poisoning
attacks. In the proposed framework, a market is created to
trade model updates based on smart contracts in blockchain
to validate the model updates against poisoning attacks au-
tomatically. Additionally, we introduce the local differential
privacy technique in smart contracts to prevent the membership
inference attacks. Specifically, we add well-designed Gaussian
noises to the model updates uploaded by the participants
to defend against membership inference attacks. We validate
our proposed security framework on two datasets, which
yielded secure FL to 5G networks. The study has several open
questions that need to be further investigated. First, because the
federated averaging algorithm is used to aggregate the model
updates, we encounter unfair usage to certain devices. Second,
efficiency issues arise since the use of deep learning algorithms
increases the computational demands of the proposed system.
Third, the more participants in the proposed framework, the
greater the communication overhead, which in turn reduces the
accuracy of FL. These are among the many issues that need to
be addressed in the road to fair and efficient blockchain-based
FL frameworks of the future.
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